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Unlike the United Kingdom and a majority of the United States, there is no legislated right to 
compensation for wrongful convictions in Canada. For those who have suffered tremendous 
personal and financial damage as a result of a wrongful incarceration, the available remedies 
include the expensive and time-consuming routes of litigation for malicious prosecution, negligent 
investigation and a Charter breach, or the highly-politicized exercise of mercy by a government 
to make an ex gratia payment. While the State’s failure to prove guilt in the criminal justice process 
as a fundamental operation of the presumption of innocence should provide relief to an accused in 
the pursuit of financial redress from a wrongful conviction, the requirement that evidence of factual 
innocence be adduced is a burden few can meet. While the Supreme Court of Canada has taken a 
broader approach than other common law jurisdictions in allowing law suits to proceed seeking 
compensation against police, the Crown and crown counsel, the legal doctrines applied have been 
questionable.   The Court has utilized tenets embodied in corrective justice models employing 
issues of fault, deterrence and vicarious liability which have severely limited recovery for a 
plaintiff who cannot prove the requisite level of neglect or malfeasance. It can be argued that the 
more principled approach would be one appropriate to the arena of public law employing 
distributive justice and strict enterprise liability. The question becomes who should bear the burden 
of the harm of a wrongful conviction: the individual as the victim of the criminal justice system, 
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1. Introduction  
a. Overview 
This critical appraisal offers an examination of the contribution of my published work1 
and seeks to demonstrate why the submitted publications constitute the basis for the award of a 
                                                 
1 The list of my Published Work as submitted to Anglia Ruskin University pursuant to its Research Degree 
Regulations, 2016 relevant to a PhD on the basis of published work is found at Appendix 1, infra. Note that each 
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doctorate. The requirements for a PhD by Published Work are that the work should demonstrate 
“an understanding of research methods appropriate to the field and an independent and original 
contribution to knowledge” (Anglia Ruskin University Regulations 2016, Part B. 2.1). This body 
of work lays out my original contribution in the field of criminal justice, sets that contribution 
within the context of my research question and more broadly current questions and debates in the 
field, and gives evidence of independent critical investigation and evaluation in relation to those 
questions, providing “a coherent contribution to research” at a level equivalent to “that of a 
conventional PhD thesis.” (Anglia Ruskin University Regulations 2016, Part B. 4.5). 
This appraisal contains four sections: 1. Introduction; 2. Research Underpinnings; 3. The 
Submitted Works, and 4. Contribution. 
Section 1. Introduction provides an overview of this appraisal and then describes my 
intellectual journey as an innocence advocate within the renowned work of the Innocence 
Movement. Section 2. Research Underpinnings sets out the research question and how the 
research is focused by contextualizing the phenomenon of wrongful convictions, compensation 
avenues of state relief versus litigation and the thresholds to financial recovery within the 
theoretical framework of risk as explored by utilizing traditional doctrinal legal research and 
non-doctrinal research as the methods. Section 3. The Submitted Works conceptualizes the corpus 
with “innocence” by breaking down the research within the stages of the criminal justice process. 
More particularly, the first publication on Bail explores the diminishing importance of the 
presumption of innocence in the pre-trial process. Thereafter the importance of the legal 
presumption is examined in the research paper on the risk harm paradigm relative to due process 
                                                 
published work has been attributed an identifier for the ease of reference to individual works that support the text of 
this critical appraisal herein. [PW 1 – 7]. The aim of each published work is contained in this Appendix. 
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rights and in the published works on innocence compensation the dichotomy between legal and 
factual innocence is illustrated to highlight how the burden of the latter most often trumps the 
value of the former.  The analysis as substantiated in the published works leads into Section 4. 
Contribution wherein the requirement of innocence, both as a normative concept and as a 
constitutional mandate is the theme that runs throughout the body of my work which provides 
coherence to my research focus. My work examines how the State approaches the risk to 
innocent individuals accused of criminality from the time of arrest to trial; the risk of convicting 
the innocent in the trial process; how the State approaches the risk of exonerating those found 
guilty yet who maintain their innocence after conviction and how the State approaches the risk of 
responsibility for the harms it has caused to innocent accused. Section 4 also sets out how my 
Published Work has added to the existing knowledge and how it has brought innovation to the 
law of wrongful convictions together with suggested reform in the pursuit of justice and the 
recognition of my work in the academy. 
The aim of this critical appraisal is to demonstrate that over a seven-year period, I have 
conducted a coherent body of research within the field of criminal law; most particularly on the 
subject of wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice with specific regard to redress for 
harms caused by errors in the criminal justice process.  My method has been traditional doctrinal 
legal research, which is both situational and reflexive and non-doctrinal legal research.  My 
research has also been interpretative and necessarily subjective. It is crucial that as part of this 
appraisal my role in producing my findings is explicated. In this regard, at the outset it must be 
noted that I am an advocate for the wrongly convicted who seek compensation. I am the founder 
and Director of The Innocence Compensation Project2 which helps the wrongly convicted and 
                                                 
2 www.innocencecompensation.org (The ICP) 
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their counsel with respect to litigation for financial recovery.  In addition, the ICP prepares and 
stewards human rights petitions to the United Nations Human Rights Committee and is a 
registered lobbyist for the purposes of for ex gratia payments under the Federal Provincial and 
Territorial Guidelines for Compensation.3  The genesis of this advocacy stems from my personal 
experience with the criminal justice system.4 
This experience prompted me to return to law school in 2009 where I was admitted into 
the Master of Laws program in Criminal Law and Procedure at Osgoode Hall Law School, in 
Toronto, Ontario.  I was determined to better understand how the criminal justice system 
worked, and in particular, to understand how damage can be inflicted upon innocent individuals 
long before any determination of guilt or to someone whose innocence cannot be relied upon for 
assistance in the criminal justice process.  It was during my LL.M when I wrote my first 
published work on “Bail and the Diminishing Presumption of Innocence.” 
Upon completion of this first graduate degree in law, I moved onto the PhD program in 
Criminology at the University of Ottawa where I established the aforesaid Innocence 
Compensation Project.5 During the first two years into my doctorate (2011, 2012) I did course 
work and researched and wrote the paper on “The Loss of Innocence and the State Risk Harm 
Paradigm.”  In the summer of 2013, I joined the faculty in the law and justice program in the 
Department of Law and Politics of Algoma University in Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario. This was a 
significant opportunity to become a member of the academy and at the same time continue my 
                                                 
3 The Federal Provincial Territorial Guidelines: Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, Entitlement to 
Compensation – The Legal Framework, online: The Government of Ontario www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca.  
4 See Appendix 2 - Reflexivity 
5 Once my final registration in the PhD program in the law school at Anglia Ruskin University was confirmed, I 
withdrew as a graduate student from the University of Ottawa effective October 31st, 2016. 
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research.  As such, from 2013 to 2016 while teaching, I created the balance of my body of 
published work.  My publication record has been central to my academic career and will 
hopefully be instrumental to the granting of a Ph.D. in law from Anglia Ruskin University. 
b. The Innocence Movement 
There is little doubt that my work and the depth of knowledge gained has skewed my 
perspective, at least initially, in that I believed that injustices in the criminal justice system were 
self-evident and ripe for reform. Indeed, this perspective is one assumed and promoted by most 
innocence advocates when the egregious harms inflicted upon the wrongly accused and 
convicted come to light. The “Innocence Movement”6 in its pursuit to rescue the wrongfully 
imprisoned has been energized with a growing public consensus found in innocence 
consciousness and its maturity in the last twenty-five years. There has been an increasing 
awareness that a significant number of individuals have spent inordinate amounts of time in 
prison after having been wrongfully convicted as a function of systemic errors in the criminal 
justice process.  Indeed, it has been suggested that “the effort to free the innocent has become the 
civil rights movement of the 21st century”.7   
The Innocence Movement took hold in and around the same time in most common-law 
jurisdictions as a function of high profile exonerations that garnered public interest due to what 
were proven to be noteworthy injustices to wrongly accused and imprisoned individuals at the 
hands of over-zealous and single-minded agents of the criminal justice system. In Canada, it was 
                                                 
6 Keith A. Findley, "Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence Movement Mergers Crime 
Control and Due Process Can We Reduce the Amount of Wrongfully Convicted People without Acquitting Too 
Many Guilty." (2008) 41 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 133 at p.141: "…the Innocence Movement has been launched by the 
more than 200 post-conviction DNA exonerations exposed since 1989". 
7 Daniel Medwed, “Innocentrism” (2008) U. Ill. L. Rev 1549 at p.1550. …describe beginnings of innocence 
movement in Canada, USA and UK. 
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the wrongful conviction of a young indigenous Donald Marshall Jr. for a murder he did not 
commit in 1971 that was overturned in 1983 which led to a federal public inquiry and subsequent 
report in 1989 that highlighted a litany of errors that were held to be systemic. In the United 
States it was the first exoneration by way of DNA analysis of Gary Dotson in 1989 who had been 
imprisoned ten years earlier for a rape that, in fact, had been fabricated.  It was this finding by 
way of conclusive evidence of innocence that gained traction in the public discourse. In the UK, 
the revelation of state abuse in the cases of the Guilford Four, Birmingham Six, Cardiff Three 
and the Maguire Seven in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s created a momentum to save the 
“innocent” that continues today. 
Nevertheless, what I saw a as a glaring remit for reform was a highly naïve proposition 
from which to commence my academic endeavours. It became clear over the course of time that 
the institutions of the State preferred the status quo in the face of wrongful convictions, having 
due regard to considerations of public confidence in the administration of justice. I have learned 
that at best, only incremental changes are achievable. It is this realization that has given rise to 
the “gap in knowledge” which this submission for a PhD by Published Work seeks to fill.8  The 
contribution I bring to this “gap” is my research into the underlying principles of justice that 
frame how the presumption of innocence operates and how the burden of proving and adducing 
factual innocence at trial and thereafter fundamentally disavows the liberal notions of personal 
worth in the absence of conviction. My contribution to the literature is my reasoned argument 
that the principle of distributive justice and the spreading of the risk of wrongful convictions and 
their indemnification best falls directly to the State for the errors of its apparatus. 
                                                 
8 Trafford. V. and Leshem . S. Stepping Stones to Achieving Your Doctorate: by Focusing on the Viva from the 
Start (Maidenhead, Open University Press,2008) at pp.170-71. I wish to thank Dr. Zoe Bennett for this reference.  
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2. Research Underpinnings 
a. The Problem 
The State is apt to be indifferent and heartless when its own wrongdoings and blunders are 
to be redressed. The reason lies partly in the difficulties of providing proper machinery and 
partly in the principle that individual sacrifices must often be borne for the public 
good…We have been ashamed to put into our code of justice any law which per se admits 
that our justice may err.  But let us be realists.  Let us confess that of course it may and 
does err occasionally.  And when the occasion is plainly seen, let us complete our justice 
by awarding compensation.  This measure must appeal to all our instincts of manhood as 
the only honourable course, the least that we can do.  To ignore such a claim is to make 
shameful an error which before was pardonable.9 
 
This quote was published over a century ago, and as can be seen throughout my published 
work, the State often still remains so heartless. The research question that provides the context of 
my research is that in a neo-liberal risk based society how does the State, its agencies, and non-
state entities dealing with and on behalf of the State employ risk management techniques to avoid 
the occurrence of wrongful convictions and address the tort liability of the State for the harm 
caused by errors in the criminal justice process when wrongful convictions do, in fact, take place?  
b. Focusing the Research 
i. The Phenomenon of Wrongful Convictions 
There is no question that the phenomenon of wrongful convictions has become an 
important issue in criminal justice over the course of the last three decades. As a function of 
examining the cases where an offender has been freed based upon clear and convincing evidence 
of innocence there has been a consensus amongst western democracies as to the systemic causes 
                                                 
9 Editorial by John Wigmore (then Dean of Northwestern School of Law) in preface to Edwin M. Borchard 
“European Systems of State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice” (1913) 3 Am.Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 
684. 
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leading to wrongful convictions. The criminological literature, legal analysis, and the findings of 
public inquiries have all agreed upon those systemic causes to include tunnel vision by the 
police, mistaken eyewitness identification, false confessions, prosecutorial misconduct, perjured 
jailhouse informants, ineffective assistance of counsel and faulty forensic science. [PW – 2]   
The literature has been particularly effective in delving into the interactive and complex nature of 
human and institutional causation of wrongful convictions and the harms suffered by the 
wrongly convicted at the hands of the criminal justice system. In addition to the more obvious 
harms on the limitations of liberty there is the visceral humiliation and disgrace, loss of 
enjoyment of life, loss of potential normal experiences such as starting a family, loss of social 
intercourse with friends and neighbours and the unique frustration, pain and suffering associated 
with adjusting to prison life knowing that it was unjustly imposed. [PW – 6] 
ii. Compensation: State v Private Remedies 
As a corollary to the innocent movement’s quest to free the innocent, there has been the 
realization of a need to restore to the wrongly convicted some semblance of a normal life going 
forward. Efforts in this regard include both services available upon re-entry into society together 
with the prospect of compensation to redress the harms caused by a wrongful imprisonment. 
Providing compensation to the wrongly convicted is a nascent area of the law, both with respect 
to applications to the State directly and by way of litigation against the State and or its actors. 
As a function of Canada’s agreement to abide by its international human rights 
obligations together with the first public inquiry in Canada into wrongful convictions,10  the 
federal government together with the provinces and territories established guidelines for 
                                                 
10 The Marshall Inquiry (Hickman Commission) Donald Marshall Jr. (Nova Scotia, 1989). 
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compensation. These guidelines (FPT Guidelines) provide a public law framework within which 
the State agrees to provide compensation in light of what are seen as intolerable errors 
committed by actors in the criminal justice system, without an admission of liability. There have 
been very few successful applications under these Guidelines although they have led to the well-
publicized awards in the millions of dollars.11 [PW – 4] 
The far more commonly used recourse for compensatory redress is the private law 
remedy of litigation against the police officers or crown counsel who have been directly 
responsible for a wrongful conviction and the resultant harm. The torts of malicious prosecution 
and negligent investigation have been developed by the Supreme Court of Canada12 in this 
regard. There is also litigation available against the State directly with respect to a breach of a 
constitutional right. 
Malicious prosecution is not in itself a new remedy. For the most part it is akin to the 
centuries old cause of action known as false imprisonment. What is new with respect to this tort 
is that unlike its treatment in most common law jurisdictions, the Court has widened its 
availability by scaling back the engagement of immunities that protect the Crown.13  The tort of 
negligent investigation established by the Court in 2007 presents a new field of endeavour.14 It 
                                                 
11 Such as Steven Truscott (The Honourable Sydney L. Robins, In the Matter of Steven Truscott: Advisory Opinion 
on the Issue of Compensation (Ontario: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2008) [Truscott received 6 million]; 
Thomas Sophonow (The Honourable Peter deCarteret Cory, The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow: The 
Investigation, Prosecution and Consideration of Entitlement to Compensation (Manitoba: Justice, 2001): 
“Compensation time”, Maclean’s 114:47 (19 November 2001) 17 [Sophonow received 2.3 million]; and David 
Milgaard  (The Milgaard Inquiry (MacCallum Commission): David Milgaard (Saskatchewan, 2008): “Milgaard will 
get $10 million compensation” CBC News (17 May 1999) online: CBC News http://www.cbc.ca).  
12 Hereinafter referred to as the “Court” unless indicated otherwise. 
13 The Court’s decisions that constitute the aggregate of the law in this field are Nelles v Ontario, [1989] 2 SCR 170; 
Proulx v Québec (AG), [2001] 3 SCR 9; and Miazga v Kvello Estate, [2009] 3 SCR 339. 
14 Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2007] 3 SCR 129. 
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does not have a comparative equivalent in other jurisdictions.15 Likewise damages for breach of 
a constitutional right were only recognized in 2010.16 [PW – 4] 
In all these novel causes of action where litigation is the route chosen to pursue 
compensation, the Court has been careful in how it frames the relief available to litigants.  
iii. Thresholds to Recovery 
There are two central issues that circumscribe the pursuit of compensation for wrongful 
convictions that are worthy of doctoral research and make a significant contribution to the 
literature, being those of “innocence” and fault. [PW – 6] [PW – 7] These issues raise 
considerations as to how the principles of corrective and distributive justice are applied in actions 
for financial redress.  It is important to note that nowhere in the text of the judicial decisions 
dealing with compensation for the relevant causes of action is there a reference to these 
principles of justice. There is no legal reasoning or reflection that provides these principles as a 
framework for consideration. These issues are legal in nature, in that, they raise legal restrictions 
to financial recovery and they do so as a function of the management of risk.  It is the dichotomy 
between how the State addresses the management of institutional risk to the issues raised by the 
societal risks inherent in wrongful convictions that frames my analysis.  With this in mind, it is 
the interplay between the concept of innocence in the criminal justice process and as engaged 
with the availability of compensation where the law and the public’s conception of justice is 
most acute. In none of the Court’s decisions dealing with the relevant causes of action is there a 
                                                 
15 Canada is the only commonwealth jurisdiction that has resisted the argument to extend crown immunity to police 
negligence. There are definitive decisions in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand that have ruled there is 
no duty of care by the police in their investigations of crime. Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (1988), [1989] 
1 AC 53 HL (Eng) (the leading case in the UK). Sullivan v Moody; Thompson v Connon, [2001] HCA 59 (following 
the English jurisprudence, Australia has denied the existence of a tort of negligent investigation). Gregory v Gollan 
[2006] NZHC 426 (New Zealand decision confirms that suspects in negligent investigations are owed no duty of care).  
16 Vancouver (City) v Ward, [2010] 2 SCR 28. 
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declaration that a plaintiff must prove his or her factual innocence above and beyond turning 
back the allegation that the suspect was guilty as charged. [PW – 6] 
There is no mention of any finding of innocence necessary to prove the tort of malicious 
prosecution. In an action for negligent investigation there is a specific reference to the effect that 
recognizing tort liability for negligent police investigation raises the prospect of “injustice” if 
persons who have been acquitted of a crime can recover damages when they in fact may well be 
guilty. Chief Justice McLachlin acknowledged that there is a possibility of such injustice in any 
tort action: 
…the legal system is not perfect. It does its best to arrive at the truth. But it 
cannot discount the possibility that a plaintiff who has established a cause of action may 
“factually” …not have been entitled to recover. The possibility of error may be greater in 
some circumstances than others. However, I know of no case with this possibility has led 
to the conclusion that tort recovery for negligence should be denied. The answer to the 
ever-present possibility of erroneous awards of damages lies elsewhere, it seems to me.… 
Evidence going to the factual guilt or innocence of the suspect, including the results of 
any criminal proceedings that may have occurred, may be relevant to [the] causation 
inquiry. It is not necessary to decide here whether an acquittal should be treated as 
conclusive proof of innocence in a subsequent civil trial. Existing authority is 
equivocal.17  
 
Likewise, the Court’s decision on damages for breach of a Charter right made clear that 
the State may establish considerations that would render damages inappropriate or unjust. In this 
regard “a complete catalog of countervailing considerations remains to be developed as the law 
in this area matures.”18 It is therefore open that factual innocence can be raised as such a 
countervailing consideration. 
                                                 
17 Hill, supra at note 14, pa.63,64. 
18 Ward, supra at note 16, pa.33. 
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This position of uncertainty taken by the Court can be contrasted with the policy of the 
Federal, Provincial, and Territorial governments with their establishment of the FPT Guidelines 
for compensation. Those guidelines, to be discussed in depth, infra, quite clearly set out that an 
applicant must meet the criterion of factual innocence as a threshold for recovery. 
The dichotomy between factual innocence and legal innocence raises a number of issues 
worthy of consideration, particularly in light of the reality that the only result of a criminal 
conviction is a finding at trial of guilty or not guilty. A finding of not guilty is not, on its face, a 
finding of innocence. This is a peculiarity that is central to how judges determine the liability of 
the State and the consequential recovery for a plaintiff.  Further, this brings into play the role of 
due process and most particularly the presumption of innocence as constitutionally protected by 
the The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.19 [PW – 2] 
With respect to the issue of fault by a state actor, there are various fault thresholds as 
prerequisites to recovery. These are found in causes of action that can be framed within the laws 
of intentional torts, negligence, and strict liability. Intentional torts and negligence require proof 
of fault by way of showing that the defendant has intentionally committed a wrong. The 
foundation of a fault regime is corrective justice. Torts of strict liability do not require proof of 
fault as supported by principles of distributive justice. [PW – 7] The Court has settled, to a great 
degree, the thresholds of fault for the private law actions of malicious prosecution and negligent 
investigation, but it is still an uncertain position and open question as to what fault should apply 
in the newest and potentially most broadly ranging remedy for the breach of a Charter right.  
                                                 
19 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.  Hereinafter referred to as the “Charter”, unless indicated otherwise. 
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c. Theoretical Framework: Risk   
For the purposes of my research the evolution of governmentality and that of risk society 
with the responsibilizing of individuals and other non-state entities that is appropriate and is the 
most justifiable theoretical framework that suits my work.20  [PW – 2] The evolution of 
institutional risk management from liberalism to neo-liberalism exemplified in the shift from the 
welfare state to the liability of individuals mirrors and provides reasoning for the shift in tort law 
from strict liability to blame.  It is the implication of risk theory as applied to criminal justice and 
risk-based governance that is of primary importance. This is applicable both as a means of risk 
spreading and risk reduction, particularly in light of the observation that since the 1970s no risk 
has preoccupied western society more than that of crime.21   
Once someone is exonerated, they create a risk to the State for liability. Exposure and 
potential losses from legal actions have always existed as risk objects. In the case of wrongful 
convictions, the State is invariably involved as a party defendant by way of a police service, a 
municipality or some other governmental department or agency. The centrality of risk that 
Garland sees as due to the “increasing salience of crime”22 in neo-liberal society has led to the 
pervasive culture of risk management and a “tort law” crisis.23 This perceived crisis has 
                                                 
20 See: Michel Foucault (1978) “Governmentality” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Graham 
Burchell, Colin Gordon, Peter Miller, eds. (Chicago, The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1991); François Ewald “Insurance 
and Risk” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller 
eds. (Chicago, The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1991); Martin Feeley and Jonathan Simon “Actuarial Justice: The 
Emerging New Criminal Law” in D. Nelken (ed.) The Future of Criminology (London, Sage Publications, 1994); 
David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Chicago, The University 
of Chicago Press, 2001);Robert Castel “From Dangerousness to Risk” (Chp.14) in The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, Peter Miller, eds. (Chicago, The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1991). 
21 See most particularly Garland, ibid. 
22 Garland, ibid at p.152 
23 See: Francine Rochford, "The Law of Negligence in a Risk Society: Calculating Ideas of Reasonable Risk" (2007) 
16 Griffith L. Rev. 172. 
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produced attempts to redefine the level of risk that necessitates intervention in the management 
of the risk of liability. The efforts to manage risk in the case of tort law have resulted in a focus 
on the techniques for assessing foreseeable degrees of risk. The question of uncertain liability is 
concerned with concerns as to what interest should tort law protect. [PW – 7] 
Fundamentally tort law is constituent of society in that it expresses how we see ourselves 
and our sense of what we owe each other. This is a function of liberalism and reflects at least 
presumptively the interests society deems just.  Justice in tort law is concerned with apportioning 
fairly the burdens and benefits of risky yet important activities. 
Within the context of wrongful convictions, those offenders who are acquitted and have 
suffered harm at the hands of the State become members of a risk pool who are now potential 
plaintiffs. It is recognized by the Court that compensation for wrongful convictions is an 
important activity.24 Nevertheless, it is an open question how broad should that liability for 
compensation be vis-a-vis the administration of justice. To what degree does judicial decision 
making responsibilize the wrongly convicted for his or her involvement in the criminal justice 
process? This brings into play the technique of risk as applied to the imposition of factual 
innocence. This requirement of a normative burden of proving factual innocence is a high-
minded proposition that is justified judicially by limiting compensation to those applicants who, 
although seen as “risky subjects” are seen as worthy because they did not commit the crime for 
which they were charged.  
 
 
                                                 
24 Per McLachlin, CJC in Ward, supra at note 16. 
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d. Methodology 
Legal research is descriptive, explanatory or exploratory depending on the research aims, 
objectives and other factors underlying a research project.25  The corpus of my published works 
includes elements of all these research designs. Each published work provides a descriptive 
analysis of the law across the spectrum of the trial process from bail [PW – 1], due process rights 
at trial [PW – 2] , extraordinary remedies post-conviction [PW – 5]  to the public and private 
law remedies available to compensate the wrongly convicted [PW – 3] [PW – 4].  In each 
instance the analysis describes the facts, the holdings, and the judicial analysis of statute and case 
law for the purpose of describing the state of the law at the time of writing. I have offered an 
explanation as to why the law is as I have described within the context of risk management and 
how the State protects its own to ostensibly bolster public confidence in the administration of 
justice.  [PW – 7] Particular regard is had to exploratory legal research in the published works 
that seek to discover how factual innocence is separated from the legal presumption of innocence 
in the criminal justice process both at trial [PW – 6] and after all avenues of appeal have been 
exhausted [PW – 2] and consequently how the burden of factual innocence becomes a millstone 
in the pursuit of compensation. [PW – 6].  
Clearly the foundational methodology for my published works has been traditional 
doctrinal research “aimed at the system isolation and critique of a defined body of positive 
law”26.  In the traditional sense my focus has been on a particular body of law and how it ought 
to be understood and how it might be improved. This approach is at the core of each published 
                                                 
25 Michael McConville and Hong Chui Wing, “Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 
2007). 
26 Theunis Roux, “Judging the Quality of Legal Research: A Qualified Response to the Demand for Greater 
Methodological Rigour” (2014) Legal Education Review 177. 
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work. Nonetheless, I also employed non-doctrinal legal research using empirical data. In this 
regard the article on bail uses quantitative data generated by Statistics Canada together with 
social facts contained in excerpts from newspapers. [PW – 1]   Burns and Hutchinson have 
pointed to a number of studies in which the judiciary are increasingly referring to “social facts” 
in their decisions.27 
 Empirical data from the federal Department of Justice is further used in the published 
work on the private, public and prerogative remedies to compensate wrongful convictions [PW – 
4] to highlight the disutility of ministerial review to address miscarriages of justice.  The social 
scientific methodology of personal interviews with an employee of the Canadian government is 
engaged to elicit an opinion on the prospect for the reform of the FPT Guidelines. There is also 
the mixed use of quantitative and qualitative research methods in the published work that creates 
the innocence continuum [PW – 6] as set out in Appendix A therein illustrating the American 
jurisdictions with compensation statutes requiring factual innocence. 
With respect to the value and limitations inherent in the primary method of doctrinal legal 
research used for my published works, to know the law of a case requires subjective and often 
reflective interpretation.  Legal scholars study the meaning of a case for its worth to future cases 
as it relates to its facts, procedure, and the court’s reasoning. The doctrinal legal research method 
is at the core of the common law. 
An analysis of published judicial decisions necessarily relies upon the discretion 
exercised by the publication policies of the courts that render those decisions as further refined 
by the policies of the publishers of those decisions. At best the cases chosen for publication 
                                                 
27 Kyle Burns and Terry Hutchinson, “The Impact of ‘Empirical Facts’ on Legal Scholarship and Legal Research 
Training” (2009) 43 The Law Teacher 153. 
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represent an incomplete picture of the judicial process that may or may not represent the broader 
legal universe. It is relevant to note that LexisNexis Quicklaw includes all judicial decisions 
released for publication by the courts as well as other decisions not so released but are 
considered “substantive” (i.e., dispositive of a substantive issue in an adversarial case).”28  As an 
alternative, research is conducted using the publicly available search engine “CanLII”29.  Many 
courts including the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice now use 
CanLII as the official repository of their decisions. It is a limitation that published decisions are 
the result of a very small percentage of legal disputes initiated. A great number of cases never 
make it to trial as a function of being withdrawn by the plaintiffs for various reasons or being 
settled between the parties. Further judges are not obliged to render written reasons for their 
decisions in those matters that do go to trial.  Often a case ends with only a declaratory judgment 
or order.  
Nonetheless published judicial decisions are a highly valuable resource to study the law. 
They are in fact “the law”. Bernard Trujillo states that published opinions are especially useful in 
studying the spread of ideas within the legal system: 
[P]ublished opinions are an important "communications device" that travel among the 
elements of the system, like proteins in a cell. Judges intend their published opinions not 
only as a communication to the parties in the particular case that gave rise to the opinion, 
but also as a communication to other judges, other lawyers, other litigants, and other 
actual and potential participants in the legal system30 
 
                                                 
28 Ellen Platt “Unpublished vs. Unreported: What’s the Difference? (1996) Perspectives: Teaching and Legal 
Research and Writing” Volume 5. SSRN Electronic Journal. 
29 In the UK see: Bailii.org. 
30 Bernard Trujillo “Patterns in a Complex System: An Empirical Study of Valuation in Business and Bankruptcy 
Cases (2005) UCLA L..Rev. 357 at p. 364-65. 
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3. The Submitted Works 
The body of my published work represents a contribution to the knowledge of the law in 
Canada with respect to the cause and effect of wrongful convictions with particular regard to the 
avenues of relief available to redress the harm caused by errors in the criminal justice process.  
There has been a dearth of literature on this topic over the last twenty-five years which addresses 
compensation for wrongful convictions in a comprehensive way. The singular exception is that 
of H. Archibald Kaiser, "Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment: Towards an End to the 
Compensatory Obstacle Course."31 [PW – 4] 
My work can be framed within the criminal justice context and the pervasive 
consciousness that crime has become part of the everyday experience to be controlled by risk 
management techniques framed within Foucault’s concept of “governmentality.” Crime has 
become a ubiquitous risk that must be routinely assessed and managed.   
Concurrently there has been a move away from the liberal ideals of due process to the 
favoring of public protection over the rights of accused resulting in an imbalance of power 
between the individual and the State.  [PW – 2] Due process rights are enshrined in the Charter 
to protect against this imbalance and are never more important than when loss of liberty is at 
stake, most particularly when the errors due to the constriction of these rights contribute to the 
acknowledged systemic factors that lead to wrongful convictions. Prominent amongst these 
rights is the presumption of innocence.  The argument goes that the presumption of innocence, 
which really means guilt not established, is not interested in factual innocence when the purpose 
of a criminal trial is to determine guilt or non-guilt. Larry Laudan sees the presumption as no 
                                                 
31 (1989) 9 Windsor Access Just 96. 
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more than an assumption there is no proof of guilt at the beginning of a trial and as such, the 
adjudicative process is fundamentally only concerned with probatory innocence32 which excludes 
the normative definition of innocence altogether.33  The importance of my contribution and the 
strength in the cohesion of my published work addresses this argument by countering that there 
is a very real benefit and justification for equating the legal presumption of innocence to factual 
innocence when errors in the criminal justice process have caused harm to innocent accused. In 
this regard, at no time is the protection of the presumption of innocence more important than at 
the very commencement of the accusation of criminality. The power of the State has come to 
call. 
a. The Presumption of Innocence from Charge to Trial 
 What is the presumption of innocence?  It has been understood as many things:  a 
legal maxim, a rule, an adage, an evidentiary burden and a doctrine that protects the status of an 
accused enmeshed in the tentacles of the criminal justice system.  It is certainly an important 
legal tenet of liberalism. Once an individual has been charged with a crime thereby engaging the 
oppressive power of the State, due process protection must be afforded to ensure that the State’s 
inability to prove guilt to the criminal standard preserves an accused’s liberty.  Liberty means 
more than simply the lack of physical restraint, rather it is a state of freedom that also includes 
the positive enjoyment of social, political, and economic rights due to all citizens in liberal 
democracies.  It would not be unreasonable to suppose that an individual is presumed innocent 
                                                 
32 Probatory innocence is where the case against the accused cannot meet the criminal standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
33 Larry Laudan, “The Presumption of Innocence: Material or Probatory.” A working paper prepared by Professor 
Laudan at the University of Texas School of Law (2008). 
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from the first moment police consider her a suspect in a criminal investigation up to and 
including the end of trial. [PW – 6] 
While there is universal support endorsing the presumption of innocence, there are two 
schools of thought on what it means.34  The first school asserts the view that it is simply a proxy 
for the legal rule that the burden is on the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that 
this burden continues throughout the trial.  The other school of thought argues that the 
presumption of innocence to have any meaningful effect must mean that it is more than a mere 
stand-in for other due process rights. The presumption is a normative principle which directs 
“state authorities as to the proper way of treating a person who is not yet convicted”35 based 
upon broad grounds of political morality and a notion of human dignity.  Various jurisdictions 
view the presumption of innocence differently both as to its substantive value and at what point it 
applies in the criminal process. 
In the United States, the presumption of innocence is not found expressly in its 
Constitution, but is an essential component of a fair trial36 and has been read into the Fifth 
Amendment37 by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish.38  Importantly, in Bell, the Court made 
clear the presumption operates strictly within the ambit of the trial itself and is solely a burden 
allocation device. In this regard, it provides no protection of any kind either pre-trial such as bail 
hearings, or post-trial which involves proceedings for post-conviction relief. [PW –3] 
                                                 
34 Rinat Kitai, “Presuming Innocence”, (2002) 55 Okla. L. Rev. 257. 
35 Ibid, at p.272. 
36 Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501 (1976) at p.503. 
37 Which protects the due process rights that no person be required to testify against herself in a criminal case or be 
subjected to double jeopardy. 
38 441 U.S. 520 (1979) [Bell] 
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A much broader view is taken in the United Kingdom where the now famous “golden 
thread” of the presumption of innocence runs throughout the criminal process in favour of the 
accused.39 [PW – 6] The presumption applies at the very least from the time the charge is laid: 
…jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has extended this central 
protective notion to preclude expressions of suspicion by the courts after acquittal and 
also declarations of guilt by agents of the state prior to trial. Moreover, a brief reference 
by the European Court of Human Rights seems to intimate that the presumption of 
innocence may go further still, and perhaps may apply to other stigmatizing actions by 
the state.40 
 
Internationally this approach is endorsed principally because the presumption is relied 
upon by virtue of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights41 and the European 
Convention on Human Rights.42 Under this broad view, the presumption of innocence is enjoyed 
by every person, at all points in time, until conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction. As 
such, the presumption influences the treatment of an accused person and has far-reaching 
ramifications on status and rights. These ramifications extend beyond the duty of the prosecution 
to prove guilt at trial with a high degree of certainty.43 [PW – 6] 
In Canada, the presumption of innocence is constitutionally protected under s.11(d) of the 
Charter.  This provision provides procedural and evidentiary protection to an accused once a 
                                                 
39 Woolmington v. D.P.P. [1935] AC 462. Moreover, the presumption of innocence is a human right in the U.K. as a 
function of Article 6, section 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights, ECHR (2. Everyone charged with a 
criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law). The ECHR is directly 
incorporated in U.K. law by virtue of the Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42. 
40 Liz Campbell, (2012). Criminal Labels, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Presumption of 
Innocence. SSRN Electronic Journal, at p.1. 
41 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, art 14, Can TS 1976 No 47, 6 ILM 368 [Covenant] 
42 ETS 5; 213 UNTS 221, Article 6(2). 
43 Kitai, supra at note 34, p.276. 
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charge has been laid, similar to the position in the United Kingdom and other European 
jurisdictions.   
With respect to the operation of the criminal justice process pre-trial, the application of 
the law of bail has always been an exercise in risk prediction.  While the presumption of 
innocence is foundational to this prediction, it can be seen that its operation over the course of 
the last forty years has become illusory at best. [PW – 1] 
At trial, the Charter’s legal rights provisions provide constitutional restraint on the power 
of the State.  The onus resting upon the Crown to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a 
reasonable doubt is inextricably linked to the presumption of innocence.  It is not hard to see how 
the Court has started to narrow the application of due process rights to protect an accused against 
only the most serious of Charter breaches as a result of the assumption that the police conduct 
their investigations in good faith. [PW – 2] Likewise, the Court’s approach to the systemic 
causes of wrongful convictions which include mistaken identification, false confessions and 
perjured jailhouse testimony show a propensity to admit what by all accounts appears to be 
tainted evidence.  
In the event of a conviction, there is no longer the protection of due process and the 
presumption of innocence. The principle of finality governs all attempts to reverse a finding 
made at trial.  While factually innocent defendants are wrongly convicted; the risk of error that 
fell upon the State to protect the accused as a function of the presumption of innocence in the 
trial process shifts inexorably to the offender to restore a state of innocence.   The rights of 
appeal and the extraordinary executive remedy under the Criminal Code provide relief to very 
few. [PW – 2] 
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b. The Role of Innocence and Post-Conviction Relief   
Once all appeals have been exhausted there is the extraordinary remedy of a conviction 
review by the federal Minister of Justice under s.696.1 of the Code.  [PW –4] It is required that 
new and significant information related to the conviction has come to light since the original trial 
and provincial appeal. Thereafter: 
Following a preliminary assessment to ascertain that all the information is included in the 
application and that a conclusion has been reached that there may be a reasonable basis to 
conclude that a miscarriage of justice has likely occurred; a case will be advanced to the 
investigation stage.44 
 
After the investigation stage the Criminal Conviction Review Group45 makes a 
recommendation to the Minister who will make a decision at will.  Section 696.3 creates the 
options the Minister has apart from an outright dismissal of the application: 
1. The case can be returned to a trial court for retrial; 
2. The case can be returned to the court of appeal in the province with jurisdiction for 
reconsideration “as if it were an appeal”; or 
3. Specific issues can be referred to the court of appeal for an opinion of a specific 
question.46 
 
                                                 
44 K. Campbell and C. Walker. The CCRC as an Option for Canada: Forwards or Backwards? The Criminal Cases 
Review Commission: Hope for the Innocent, M. Naughton (UK, Palgrave MacMillan, 2010) at p.192. 
45 The Criminal Conviction Review Group is a handful of lawyers working for the Department of Justice, or on 
retainer from outside the Department of Justice who examine the information provided by the applicant to see if it is 
reasonably capable of belief and relevant to the guilt or innocence of the applicant. 
46 The Minister also has authority by virtue of the exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy to order a pardon 
under s.748 of the Code. 
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The difference between these alternatives is significant.  A retrial would resurrect the 
presumption of innocence and therefore the burden falls back onto the Crown to prove the 
essential elements of the offence(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. A referral to a court of appeal is 
treated as any other appeal and therefore the burden falls to the applicant to overturn the 
conviction on the same basis as a direct appeal.  In the Reference in the case of David 
Milgaard47, the Court set out the different burdens of proof that an applicant would have to meet 
to trigger the different remedies available to the Minister with respect to a finding of a 
miscarriage of justice. While there is no requirement to prove innocence, per se, it is implicit in 
the determination of a miscarriage of justice.  In this regard, proof of innocence beyond a 
reasonable doubt would warrant of a free pardon under s.748 (2) of the Code; proof of innocence 
on a preponderance of evidence would warrant a reference to a court of appeal to determine 
whether the conviction should be vacated and an acquittal entered.  Fresh evidence that could 
reasonably be expected to have affected the verdict would warrant a new trial.48  [PW – 2] The 
efficacy of the ministerial review process has been commented upon extensively.49   This avenue 
for redress is very limited and has resulted in relief to a very few.  A review of the data published 
by the Government of Canada in the Department of Justice Annual Reports reveals that between 
                                                 
47 Milgaard, supra at note 11. Milgaard was wrongly convicted for the murder of Gail Miller in 1970 and served 
almost 22 years prior to his release in 1992 and ultimate exoneration in 1997. 
48 Ibid at pgs. 869-871 
49 Joan Braiden, “Remedying Wrongful Convictions through Applications to the Minister of Justice under Section 
690 of the Criminal Code” (1999) 17 Windsor Y.B. Access to Justice 3; Kathryn Campbell and Clive Walker “The 
CCRC as an Option for Canada: Forwards or Backwards? The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Hope for the 
Innocent.” M. Naughton. (UK, Palgrave MacMillan, 2010); Kathryn Campbell, "Policy responses to wrongful 
conviction in Canada: the role of conviction review, public inquiries and compensation." (2005) 41 Criminal Law 
Bulletin 145; Kent Roach, “The Role of Innocence Commissions: Error Discovery, Systemic Reform or Both, The 
Symposium on Criminal Procedure" (2010) Chi. - Kent L. Rev. 89; K. Roach, "Wrongful Convictions in Canada." 
(2011) U.Cin.L.Rev: 1465; P. J. Saguil, "Improving Wrongful Conviction Review: Lessons from a Comparative 
Analysis of Continental Criminal Procedure Forum: Criminal Procedure." (2007) Alberta Law Review 117; Kerry 
Scullion, "Wrongful Convictions and the Criminal Conviction Review Process Pursuant to Section 696.1 of the 
Criminal Code of Canada Wrongful Convictions: Perspectives, Experiences, and Implications for Justice - 
Commentaries on Wrongful Conviction." (2004) Canadian J. Criminology & Crim. Just. 189. 
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April 1st, 2009 and March 31st, 2014 there were seventy-two applications filed under s.696.1 of 
the Code. During that same period there were only two successful such applications.   
 By way of contrast to other jurisdictions and how the State can directly address wrongful 
convictions “the pioneer and gold standard of the error correction model is the Criminal Cases 
Review Commission (CCRC) created for England, Wales and Northern Ireland.”50    The CCRC 
is an independent executive public body established in 1997 pursuant to the provisions of the 
Criminal Appeal Act, 1995.51 [PW – 2] 
 The mandate of the CCRC is to review the applications of convicted defendants who 
claim they have been wrongly convicted and to refer cases to the Court of Appeal for review 
where there is a “real possibility that the conviction, verdict, finding or sentence would not be 
upheld were the reference to be made.”52   The “real possibility” test is not defined in the 
Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, however in R v CCRC, ex parte Pearson53, the Queen’s Bench, 
Divisional Court described the standard as “more than an outside chance or a bare possibility, but 
which may be less than a probability or a likelihood or a racing certainty” that the conviction will 
be found “unsafe.”54    
Initially an accused was able to raise any ground of appeal once a reference was ordered 
back to the Court of Appeal, but this has been amended to only allow appeals on grounds 
verified by the CCRC or on other grounds where the Court of Appeal has granted leave. In 
essence, the CCRC makes its decisions strictly on legal criteria relating to the hearing of appeals, 
                                                 
50 Kent Roach, "Role of Innocence Commissions: Error Discovery, Systemic Reform or Both, The Symposium on 
Criminal Procedure: Innocence." (2010) 85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 89 at p.93. 
51 Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c.35. 
52 Ibid, section 13 
53 [1999] 3 All E.R. 498 (Eng.). 
54 Ibid at para 17. 
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and indeed “…the CCRC does not directly consider factual innocence and has referred cases 
back to the Court of Appeal on technical legal grounds relating to changes in the law and 
procedural irregularities.”55    It is this adherence to legal issues that relate to how the Court of 
Appeal would assess a case without regard to factual innocence which is at the heart of strident 
criticism of this gold standard of error correction:  
As time has passed… It is become increasingly apparent, particular to those of a more 
critical persuasion and or who provide casework assistance to alleged innocent victims of 
wrongful conviction, that the CCRC is not the solution to the wrongful conviction of the 
factually innocent that it was widely thought to be.56  
   
Michael Naughton believes that the role of the CCRC has fundamentally become the 
second-guessing of how the Court of Appeal would approach a matter and in effect has fatally 
compromised its independence and with it, its ability to assist innocent victims of wrongful 
conviction. The CCRC does not attempt to determine the truth of alleged miscarriages of justice, 
but rather whether convictions might be considered “unsafe” by the Court of Appeal, and as such 
“[t]his disconnects the CCRC entirely from a concern with whether alleged victims of 
miscarriages of justice that apply to it for review are factually innocent or guilty.”57   It is 
therefore clear that the opportunity for ministerial review in order to obtain an exoneration is 
exceptionally limited.   
If proof of innocence is so difficult to adduce as a remedy by way of ministerial review, 
collateral relief for the factually innocent after conviction may well be available under s.24 (1) of 
the Charter as a function of the exercise of the prerogative writ of habeas corpus.  [PW – 5] The 
                                                 
55 Roach, supra at note 50, p.95 
56 Michael Naughton, "The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Innocence Versus Safety and the Intergrity of the 
Criminal Justice System." (2012) 58 Criminal Law Quarterly 207 at p.211. 
57 Ibid.   
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ancient writ of habeas corpus had its origins in the English common law and has been adopted as 
such in Canada.  The first decision of the Court recognizing this writ was in 1885, only ten years 
after the Court’s creation.58  Jurisprudence has touched upon the writ’s relevance on a rather 
periodic basis ever since.59 I argue that when all else has failed, habeas corpus as "The Great 
Writ of Liberty"60 as a fundamental error conviction device may well be the last best hope to get 
evidence of innocence before a court for the purposes of exoneration.    
c. Factual Innocence and Compensation for Wrongful Convictions 
 Once someone is exonerated, they create a risk to the State for liability.  In the case of 
wrongful convictions, the State is invariably involved as a party defendant by way of a police 
service, a municipality or some other governmental department or agency. [PW – 7] There are 
various civil avenues available to seek compensation found in the tort claims of malicious 
prosecution, negligent investigation and an action for breach of a constitutional right. The 
prospects for recovery in private and public law actions are daunting.   
Any discussion on the rights of individuals as it relates to actions against their 
government directly must firstly be put into the context of the state’s obligations to its citizenry, 
as engaged by a state’s position on the adoption of international human rights.  In the western 
world, as World War II ended, diplomats meeting in San Francisco adopted the Charter of the 
United Nations,61 which placed unprecedented emphasis on human rights. Three years later, the 
                                                 
58 In re Melina Trepanier (1985) 12 S.C.R. 111.   
59 The most recent decision of the Court is Mission Institution v Khela, [2014] 1 SCR 502. 
60 Per LeBel J. and Fish J. in May v. Ferndale Institution (2005), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 809 at pa. 19. 
61 1 UNTS XVI. 
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United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,62 a 
document that established international law in this regard. [PW – 4] 
In 1966, the work that the United Nations General Assembly had begun with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was complimented by two multilateral treaties: the 
International Covenant on Civil Rights and Political Rights63 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.64  The Canadian government as a State Party, with the 
agreement of all the provincial governments, acceded to these two covenants on May 19, 1976.  
Canada was required, as were all signatories, pursuant to article 2(2) of the Covenant to 
do the following: 
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party 
to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such 
laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant.  
 
This is the principal international human rights instrument to which Canada is bound. 
With particular regard to compensation for wrongful convictions, Article 14(6) is particularly 
important, in that: 
When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when 
subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that 
a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of 
justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be 
compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown 
fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.  
 
                                                 
62 G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948). 
63 Covenant, supra at note 41. 
64 19 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3, Can TS 1976 No 46. 
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It is significant to note that unlike almost all international rights instruments, including 
the Covenant, the Charter does not recognize a right to compensation for a contravention of 
liberty interests where an individual has been wrongfully convicted and punished for a criminal 
offence.    Nonetheless, Canada demonstrated its commitment to addressing its international 
obligations to human rights by creating a task force composed of federal and provincial justice 
ministers that researched the wrongful conviction problem and proffered guidelines in 1985 
governing compensation.  
In 1988, Canada's federal, provincial, and territorial governments adopted the FPT 
Guidelines providing state access to compensation for wrongful convictions in selected cases on 
a non-statutory basis by virtue of the prerogative of mercy.  [PW – 4] 
The Guidelines can be summarized as follows:  
1. The wrongful conviction must have resulted in imprisonment, all or part of which 
has been served.  
2. Compensation should only be available to the actual person who has been 
wrongfully convicted and imprisoned.   
3. Compensation should only be available to an individual who has been wrongfully 
convicted and imprisoned as a result of a Criminal Code or other federal penal offence.  
4. As a condition for compensation, there must be a free pardon granted under the 
Criminal Code or a verdict of acquittal entered by an appellate court pursuant to a referral made 
by the Minister of Justice under the Code.  
5. All available appeal remedies must have been exhausted and a new or newly 
discovered fact has emerged, tending to show that there has been a miscarriage of justice.  
6. Compensation should only be granted to those persons who did not commit the 
crime for which they were convicted.  
 
This final provision incorporates the requirement that applicants must prove factual 
innocence to be eligible to the state’s discretionary remedy.  It has been argued that this creates 
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an unprincipled approach in the pursuit of compensation for a wrongful conviction.65  [PW –6] 
More particularly, in almost all jurisdictions today the result of a criminal conviction is either a 
finding at trial of guilty or not guilty.   A finding of not guilty is not a statement of innocence.  
As such, the withdrawal or dismissal of charges before trial, an acquittal at trial, or an acquittal 
after a successful appeal are not, in themselves, proof of innocence.  Christopher Sherrin has 
proposed that declarations of innocence should be made available to individuals acquitted at trial 
for the very purpose of climbing above the limits of a finding of not guilty.66 Such declarations 
could be used for a number of purposes including the “destigmatization” of being an accused and 
for subsequent applications for compensation.  The negative consequences of imposing this 
additional burden upon an accused after undertaking the rigours of being acquitted at trial and the 
prospect that many actually innocent accused would not pursue a declaration of innocence for 
any number of reasons however makes this proposal untenable.  
I am not arguing that there should be a third verdict of “innocent” in the trial process or 
some other disciplinary mechanism that might allow for a declaration of innocence in the 
criminal justice process.67   The pursuit of such a verdict or declaration would reproduce the 
power currently embedded in the justice system.  As Carol Smart notes, the problem with 
                                                 
65 This requirement has been discussed in numerous commissions of inquiry and found to be harsh.  See e.g. 
Milgaard, supra note 11 at 414 (Recommendation 12 states: “Compensation for wrongful conviction lies within the 
purview of the Executive and should remain there, but factual innocence, as the sole criterion for paying 
compensation, is unduly restrictive. Where a miscarriage of justice has resulted from an obvious breach of good 
faith in the application of standards expected of police, prosecution, or the courts, the door to compensation should 
not be closed for lack of proof of factual innocence”).  See also Christine E. Sheehy, “Compensation for Wrongful 
Conviction in New Zealand” (1999) 8 (4) Auckland U L Rev 977 at p.994 “[n]ot only does a ‘proof of innocence’ 
threshold place a heavy burden on individuals and risk tipping the power imbalance in favour of the State, but some 
fear that it may compromise the presumption, as a failure to compensate may taint an acquittal.” 
66 Christopher Sherrin, “Declarations of Innocence” (2010) 35 Queen’s L.J. 437. 
67 In Scotland, there is the prospect of a third verdict of “not proven” which is one of the two choices relative to an 
acquittal. It can be argued that “not proven” is appropriate in cases where there is insufficient proof to convict 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The verdict is meant to stand for the proposition that an accused is not entitled to be 
found “not guilty.” In this way, “not guilty” would tend to be the legal equivalent of innocent. The Scottish Justice 
Committee is currently undertaking a review of the Criminal Verdicts (Scotland) Act and appears inclined to remove 
the option of this third verdict from the Scottish criminal justice process: BBC News, 9 Feb.2017. 
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challenging a form of power by accepting its terms of reference leads to losing the battle before it 
begins, in that “[l]aw has its own method, its own testing ground, its own specialized language 
and system of results…it claims to have the method to establish the truth.”68    Law has the power 
to attribute legal rights to legal subjects and to disqualify those subjects and rights.  All law 
reform empowers the law, but the counter discourse couched in terms of promoting a recognized 
human right gives power to the acquitted.  Rights are attractive in that they are seen as protecting 
the weak against the strong or the individual against the state.  It is not difficult to frame the 
process of all exonerations, including wrongful convictions, in this same light. The counter 
discourse is that the presumption of material innocence applies from the time of charge to trial 
and thereafter is reinstated in the event of a successful appeal.  Innocence should therefore be not 
merely a finding of not guilty, but rather a restoration to the premise that the accused is in no 
different a position than if the charges had never been laid in the first place.   
Nevertheless, although the FPT Guidelines do not have the force of law, their mutual 
acceptance at all levels of government represents consensus with respect to political policy, and 
may well constitute a constitutional convention. Since compensation is not paid by virtue of a 
statutory enactment, but rather by means of executive discretion, payments made to the 
wrongfully convicted are considered “ex gratia.” The utility of ex gratia payment “has been 
criticized as ad hoc, unjust, and manifestly inadequate”69 as awards may appear arbitrary since 
                                                 
68 Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of the Law (London, Routledge, 1989) at pp.9, 10. 
69 Sheehy, supra at note 65, p.980. From time to time notices and press releases are published by the various 
jurisdictions relating to decisions made on applications for compensation under the Guidelines. For example, in 
Ontario, the Communications Branch for the Attorney-General released two statements on January 13, 2010 in the 
Matters of Anthony Hanemaayer and Robert Baltovich. The men were convicted and imprisoned for sexual assault 
and homicide they did not commit. Both cases were clearly instances of miscarriages of justice. Ministry of the 
Attorney General of Ontario, News Release, “Matter of Compensation In R. v. Hanemaayer” (13 January 2010); 
Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario, News Release, “Matter of Compensation in R. v. Baltovich” (13 
January 2010) [emphasis added]).  Nonetheless, both were deemed inappropriate for compensation by the Ontario 
government. The reasons given were identical: “A number of factors are taken into consideration to determine if a 
case is sufficiently rare and unusual to warrant financial compensation.” Apparently neither met that threshold. 
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they are determined in secrecy. It has been further argued that “[e]x gratia payments clearly do 
not meet the requirements of Article 14(6), as compensation is mandatory under the Covenant, 
not a matter of grace.”70   
The United Kingdom has directly incorporated Article 14(6) into its domestic legislation 
under the Criminal Justice Act, 1988.71  [PW – 6] A wrongfully convicted person must make an 
application to the Secretary of State, who determines applications for compensation on the 
criteria set out in section 133:  
When a person has been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his 
conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly 
discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that there has been a miscarriage of 
justice, the Secretary of State shall pay compensation for the miscarriage of justice to the 
person who has suffered punishment as a result…    
 
Note that this legislation does not simply provide the wrongfully convicted with an option 
to have the case reviewed, but creates an enforceable right using language that closely mirrors 
that of the Covenant.  Under the Criminal Justice Act, 1988 the final decision on whether 
compensation should be paid rests with the Secretary of State, but it is based solely on the criteria 
set out in section 133, and requires only a threshold determination that the case qualifies under 
the statute. The creation of this statutory scheme to compensate the wrongfully convicted in the 
U.K. is held up to be the model that best incorporates the mandate of the Covenant. This scheme 
replaced the prior non-statutory discretionary ex gratia environment formerly exercised by the 
Home Secretary.  However, it has been argued that the statutory provisions have become so 
                                                 
Nowhere is there public documentation including any material related to the Guidelines that sets out what would 
render a miscarriage of justice “sufficiently rare and unusual” to warrant compensation, or that this exceptionally 
exclusive phrase is elemental to entitlement. 
70 Ibid at p.987. 
71 Criminal Justice Act, 1988 (UK), c 33. 
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restrictive and cumbersome that it does not meet the obligations imposed by international human 
rights law. Professor Jonathan Spencer opined “[i]n my view, the current rules about the 
compensation of victims of miscarriages of justice in England are as bad as it is possible to make 
them – short perhaps of a blanket rule that no compensation is ever paid to anyone at all. They 
are both harsh, and arbitrary.  And they are devoid of intelligent justification…”72   In R (Adams) 
v Justice Secretary73 the Supreme Court expanded the threshold for an application for 
compensation to include within the definition of a miscarriage of justice those innocent at law in 
addition to the traditional threshold of factual innocence. But in R (on the application of Ali and 
others) v Secretary of State for Justice74 this broad threshold for relief pursuant to s. 133 was 
narrowed. The court held that the test for the Secretary of State to consider when determining 
whether a miscarriage of justice occurred to be “[h]as the claimant established, beyond 
reasonable doubt, that no reasonable jury (or magistrates) properly directed as to the law, could 
convict on the evidence now to be considered?”75   More recently:  
 Section 175 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which came into 
force on 13 March 2014, has reversed the effect of the judgments in Adams and Ali. It 
states that there will have been a miscarriage of justice “if and only if the new or newly 
discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that the person did not commit the 
offence.”76   
 
The new definition applies to the determination of any application for compensation 
made on or after March 13, 2014 and to applications made before that date but which had not 
finally been determined by the Secretary of State.  The Ministry of Justice’s impact assessment 
                                                 
72 John R. Spencer, “Compensation for Wrongful Imprisonment” (2010) 11 Crim L Rev 803 at 815. 
73 [2012] 1 AC 48. 
74 [2013] EWHC 72 (Admin). 
75 Ibid, at pa.41. 
76 Sally Lipscombe & Jacqueline Beard “Miscarriages of Justice: compensation schemes – Commons Library 
Standard Note (Published June 20, 2014/ Standard Note SN02131 at 7): “A New Statutory Definition”. 
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for the change stated that it was being made to ensure that eligibility to the compensation scheme 
was limited to applicants who could show that they were clearly factually innocent. It stated that 
the intended effect was to lessen the burden on taxpayers and reduce unnecessary and expensive 
legal challenges to government decisions to refuse compensation.77  
At the other end of the scale we have the lone jurisdiction that has only endorsed an 
“understanding” of the international legal position on compensation. [PW – 4] The United States 
“understand[s]”78 Article 14(6) to require signatories to create "effective and enforceable 
mechanisms by which a victim of an unlawful arrest or detention or a miscarriage of justice may 
seek and, where justified, obtain compensation from either the responsible individual or the 
appropriate governmental entity,"79 thus it is not an absolute right to compensation.  Further, the 
United States believes that the international right to compensation is "subject to the reasonable 
requirements of domestic law."80  Nowhere in the understanding are there any definitions of what 
this means.  The lack of American federally mandated policy has led directly to a patchwork of 
compensation systems for the wrongly convicted under which compensation rights and remedies 
vary tremendously by jurisdiction.   
 With particular regard to the various thresholds to entitlement to statutory compensation, 
it is widely believed that in order to avoid frivolous claims, states should agree to require “proof 
of actual innocence before agreeing to compensate.”81  Adele Bernhard advocates a requirement 
                                                 
77Ibid. 
78 With respect to the United States’ obligation as a signatory to the Covenant. 
79 Jason Costa, “Alone in the World: The United States' Failure to Observe the International Human Right to 
Compensation for Wrongful Conviction” (2005) 19 Emory Int’l L Rev 1615 at 1618. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Shawn Armbrust, "When money isn't enough: the case for holistic compensation of the wrongfully convicted." 
(2003) 41 (1) Am. Crim. L. Rev. 157 at p.171. 
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that proof of factual innocence be presented only by way of clear and convincing evidence.82   
[PW – 6] 
 Therefore, the requirement to prove factual innocence in the FPT Guidelines, under s.133 
of the Criminal Justice Act, 1988 and all American states that have statutory compensation 
schemes is a significant limitation to a financial recovery from a wrongful conviction.  It is, in 
essence, a normative burden and institutional risk management technique imposed by the State 
and supported by the public, writ large.  Worse still, there are very few efficacious ways that this 
burden can be met, and none that stand as independent remedies in most justice systems to meet 
the requirement of innocence.   I argue that the threshold of factual innocence should be 
presumed to have been met with reliance upon the presumption of innocence whenever the State 
fails in its efforts to prove criminality.  
In the event that a wrongly convicted individual can climb over the hurdle of factual 
innocence in her claim for financial redress, there still remains thresholds to recovery by way of 
fault regimes, crown immunities and issues of vicarious liability. [PW – 7] With these in mind, 
the principled approach to any misfeasance caused by the police or crown counsel in the 
investigation and prosecution of crime is for errors to with be framed as a constitutional tort. In 
this way, the State is subject to strict enterprise liability which removes the various burdens to 
the pursuit of compensation for those egregiously harmed by the criminal justice system. 
4. Contribution of Published Work 
a. Coherence 
                                                 
82 Adele Bernhard, "When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction." (1999) 6 U. Chi. L. Sch. 
Roundtable 73 at p.108. 
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 Innocence, both as a liberal state to which everyone is entitled absence a criminal 
conviction and as a constitutional presumption to provide protection against the power of the 
State in the criminal justice process is the theme that provides coherence to my published work. 
As a normative principle innocence grounds the authority of the State to treat individuals not 
convicted as entitled to dignity and moral worth. While one can hope that this ideal enlightens 
the constitutional mandate underlying the presumption of innocence, the reality is otherwise. 
It has been seen how this presumption has been consistently eroded with respect to the 
law of bail over the last two decades. Both case law and statutory enactment have diminished the 
importance of innocence by restricting the grounds upon which release can be made and 
consequentially resulting in a dramatic increase in remand custodial admissions. At trial, integral 
to the presumption of innocence is the burden on the crown to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. It is incumbent upon a court to ensure that evidence admitted and put to a jury must 
safeguard that no innocent person be convicted. Nevertheless, due process rights enshrined in the 
Charter to provide such a safeguard have been judicially constrained to the point where it is now 
presumed that police in gathering evidence have done so properly unless an accused can 
confidently prove bad faith.  
It has also become clear that in the event of a wrongful conviction there is no longer the 
protection of the presumption of innocence.  The burden falls to the offender to prove innocence 
in an appeal or in an application under the Code for ministerial review. Innocence in this regard 
is not that of a legal nature but one of fact. This can be contrasted to the error correction model in 
the UK of the CCRC. There the criticism lies in the negation of any consideration of actual 
innocence. Once the opportunity for executive action has passed in Canada, the prospect of 
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adducing evidence of innocence before the court is nonexistent. I argue, however, that the 
ancient writ of habeas corpus can play this role.  
Within the context of compensation for wrongful convictions it is evident that a verdict of 
not guilty is not sufficient to overcome the threshold of factual innocence to found a claim.  It is 
clear that the requirement to prove factual innocence in Canada, the United Kingdom and those 
American states that have statutes providing compensation for the wrongly convicted is a 
significant burden and one few can overcome.  
b. Contribution to Existing Literature 
As noted, my published work is the first comprehensive contribution on the law relating 
to compensation for wrongful convictions since H.A. Kaiser’s article in 1989. For the first time 
there is an explication of the private law remedies as contrasted with public law remedies within 
the context of crown liability and prerogative powers. This explanation of the law on innocence 
compensation is further refined with the only published comparative analysis with American 
statute and case law. My article on bail provides an illustration on how the dramatic increase in 
remand custody has coincided with the diminishing reliance upon the presumption of innocence 
by way of statistical data represented in charts and graphs. 
My work contextualizes the state’s approach to providing recovery for errors in the 
criminal justice process within the theory of institutional risk management. It does so in a 
comprehensive manner by applying theories of risk to the presumption of innocence and other 
due process rights from the time of charge to trial and thereafter on appeal or executive action to 
issues of compensation. In this way my work highlights the various measures taken or adopted 
by the State to avoid disrepute in the administration of justice. This analysis on state liability is 
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further explored in my work on how private law principles are applied to public law remedies, 
most particularly with respect to the application of corrective and distributive justice. In this 
regard, I make a substantial contribution to the literature by examining how thresholds to 
financial recovery favour the State and I argue that in this nascent area of criminal justice the 
appropriate approach would be that of distributive justice within the confines of strict enterprise 
liability. 
Lastly I have proposed an innovative approach to the law of wrongful convictions that 
could provide an effective remedy to putting the proof of factual innocence before a court after 
all appeal routes have been exhausted by way of habeas corpus. I have conceptualized the 
presumption of innocence into components of factual and legal innocence on a continuum so as 
to meet the threshold test of innocence required in applications for state remedies in a way 
supported by the international human right’s approach to the presumption of innocence.   
c. Recommendations for Reform 
 By way of reform, I have recommended the establishment of a statutory scheme to create 
a tribunal as a vehicle to pursue compensation. I have suggested the model for the tribunal would 
be that of Criminal Injuries Compensation Boards currently in place in every provincial 
jurisdiction in Canada, save one. The statute would set out the thresholds for recovery. The 
necessity to show innocence will be assumed to be met by an exoneration in any manner that 
brought an end to the accusation of criminality.  If the Crown wishes to contest this position, it 
would bear the burden to do so on the civil standard on a balance of probabilities.  The quantum 
of compensation would be based upon the American model of a fixed amount due for each year 
of wrongful incarceration which is far more transparent than the current ex gratia scheme. The 
further elements of fault that are at play in the private law actions of malicious prosecution and 
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negligent investigation would be done away with by basing the statutory entitlement as one 
founded upon a broadly based utility of s.7 of the Charter. Therein, miscarriages of justice 
resulting from the acknowledged systemic causes of wrongful convictions would be recognized 
as a breach of the right to the “liberty and security” of the person. As such, the tribunal would be 
one designed to administer justice for constitutional torts, which, by its nature, incorporates the 
principles of distributive justice and assumes that wrongful convictions are organizational errors 
of the criminal justice system. 
d. Recognition in the Academy 
 My published work is recognized in the academy empirically by virtue of the number of 
downloads and citations to it and qualitatively by requests to personally participate in scholarly 
events and by responses to my submissions. As at the date of this thesis submission there have 
been 722 downloads of my published work within the Social Science Research Network and 
there have been 112 views on Academia.edu since October 1st, 2016. 
Google Scholar and Academia.edu identify eleven citations in journal articles, papers and 
thesis research. My published work has been cited in the following: 
Margaret K. Lewis “Presuming Innocence, or Corruption, in China: (2012) Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law; 
Jane B. Sprott, Nicole M. Myers “Set up to Fail: The Unintended Consequences of 
Multiple Bail Conditions: (2011) Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice; 
Caroline Davidson, “May it Please the Crown? The Role of Public Confidence, Public 
Order and Public Opinion in Bail for International Criminal Defendants” (2011) 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review; 
Jane B. Sprott, “The Persistence of Status Offences in the Youth Justice System” (2012) 
Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice; 
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W.P. deVilliers “Problematic aspects with regard to bail under South African law: The 
reverse onus provisions and the admission of the evidence of the applicant for bail at the 
later criminal trial revisited” (2015) International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 17; 
Aleksandr Khechumyan, “The Nature of Pre-Trial Detention in the Republic of Armenia” 
(2011) The 63rd Annual Meeting of the American Association of Criminology; 
W. Damon “Spatial Tactics in Vancouver's Judicial System” (2014) - summit.sfu.ca 
Mark Stobbe “Guilty until Proven Innocent: the Truth in Sentencing Act and the growth 
of pre-conviction incarceration in Canada” (2015) Annual Conference of the Canadian 
Sociological Association; 
E.T. Dej, “Seeking Inclusion In the 'Land of Broken Toys': Negotiating Mental Health 
Managerialism Among Homeless Men and Women” (2016) summit.sfu.ca 
L.C. Hanright “A qualitative study of the issues that govern the compensation process for 
wrongful convictions” (2016) summit.sfu.ca. 
M.L. Lovegrove, “Investigative Inadequacies or Investigative Corruption? Exploring the 
Role of Police Misconduct within Canadian Wrongful Conviction Cases” (2016) 
scholars.wlu.ca. 
 
I am invited to speak at conferences and seminars on a regular basis.  The faculty of law 
at the University of Ottawa arranges for my attendance every fall to give a lecture on innocence 
compensation to an upper year class in a course on wrongful convictions.  I have been 
interviewed on a number of occasions for my opinion on my knowledge in the field by the 
media, both print and visual. I also sit on the Policy Review Committee of the Canadian Criminal 
Justice Association as a function of my expertise on wrongful convictions. I am in the initial 
stages of discussion with the Chair of the Heads of Prosecution Committee for Canada to assist 
their work in updating their 2011 Report “Path to Justice – Preventing Wrongful Convictions.”  
The nature of my research will be an analysis of how police services and Crown counsel across 
the country have implemented best practices in order to avoid the recognized systemic causes of 
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wrongful convictions and how the issue of indemnity has been handled when law suits are 
brought seeking relief from the harm caused when wrongful convictions take place. 
Two comments made to me upon the submission of my work are relevant to my 
contribution. On June 5th, 2015, I received a letter from James E. Robertson, Editor-in-Chief of 
the The Criminal Law Bulletin extending an offer to publish my “excellent” article on the 
Innocence Continuum. I am particularly proud of an email from Professor Kent Roach, who is 
Professor of Law and Prichard-Wilson Chair of Law and Public Policy at the University of 
Toronto Faculty of Law and the widely recognized preeminent Canadian scholar on wrongful 
convictions. On April 2nd, 2015 in his role as editor of the Criminal Law Quarterly, Professor 
Roach thanked me for agreeing to publish my “important” work on the use of habeas corpus as a 
remedy for the wrongly convicted.  I believe Professor Roach is correct. My identification and 
reasoning that advocates for habeas corpus as an error correction device in Canada will prove to 
be a game changer in the tools to exonerate the factually innocent. 
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Appendix 1 - List of Published Work 
 
 
1.  “Bail and the Diminishing Presumption of Innocence” (2010) 15 Can. Crim. Law 
Review 57 
[ProQuest; SSRN; English & Commonwealth eJournal; Canadian Law eJournal]  
[PW -1]  
Aim: to provide a history of the law of Bail in Canada and its underlying 
constitutional protection of the presumption of innocence and to illustrate how over the 
course of two decades Parliament and the Supreme Court have expanded the grounds 
for retention resulting in an exponential growth in remand custody. 
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2. “The Loss of Innocence and the State Risk Harm Paradigm” (2012) Research 
Paper [SSRN] 
[PW – 2] 
Aim: to explore the state risk harm paradigm with regard as to how the State 
approaches the risk of wrongful conviction posed to innocent accused individuals from 
the time of arrest at trial; the risk of convicting the innocent in trial process; how the 
State approaches the risk of exonerating those found guilty yet who maintain their 
innocence after conviction and how the State approaches the risk of responsibility when 
harm is caused notwithstanding the risk avoidance techniques previously employed by 
the State. 
 
3. “Innocence Compensation: A Comparative Look at the American and Canadian       
Approaches” (2013) 49 (2) Criminal Law Bulletin 218 
[Westlaw; SSRN; Criminology eJournal, Vol.8 Issue 55; Law & Society: Public Law 
eJournal, Vol.8 Issue 188; International, Transnational & Comparative Criminal Law 
eJournal, Vol.7 Issue 37; Canadian Law eJournal, Vol.9, Issue 29] 
[PW – 3] 
Aim: to illustrate the similarities and differences in the approaches between the United 
States and Canada in providing compensation for the wrongly convicted. The strengths 
and weaknesses in these approaches are highlighted. 
 
4. “Innocence Compensation: the Private, Public and Prerogative Remedies” (2014) 
45 (1) Ottawa Law Review 57 
[HeinOnline; Google Scholar; SSRN; Canadian Law eJournal; Law & Society: Public 
Law – Crime, Criminal Law & Punishment eJournal: Comparative Law eJournal, 
Vol.12 Issue 58] 
[PW – 4] 
Aim: To produce the seminal comprehensive guide to the private, public and 
prerogative remedies available to compensate the wrongly convicted, together with the 
argument to advance reform to employ a specialist tribunal to provide accessibility and 
transparency within a reasoned legislative framework. 
 
5. “Habeas Corpus and Innocence: a Remedy for the Wrongly Convicted” (2016) 63 
(2) Criminal Law Quarterly 206 
[HeinOnline, Google Scholar, Westlaw; to be distributed on or after September 1st, 
2016 on SSRN as per copyright agreement]  
[PW – 5] 
Aim: to illustrate the limitations for the wrongly convicted to adduce evidence of 
innocence post- conviction; to argue that the Supreme Court of Canada’s position on 
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the utility of habeas corpus as an error conviction device is ill-founded; and to put into 
the hands of advocates a tool to free the innocent. 
 
6. “Compensation for Wrongful Convictions and the Innocence Continuum” (2016) 
52 (2) Criminal Law Bulletin 346 
[Westlaw; SSRN; Criminal Procedure eJournal, Vol.10 Issue 11; Law & Society: 
Public Law eJournal, Vol.11 Issue 49; Social & Political Philosophy eJournal, Vol.8 
Issue 121] 
[PW – 6] 
Aim: to put into practice a broadly-based interpretation of the presumption of 
innocence so that the legal elements of the presumption stand as sufficient proof of 
factual innocence for the purposes of seeking a state remedy for compensation for 
wrongful convictions in Canada and United States. 
 
7. “Innocence Compensation: Private Law Principles for Public Law Remedies” 
(2016) Research Paper [SSRN] 
[PW – 7] 
Aim: to explore the foundational principles of corrective and distributive justice 
within the context of state liability for wrongful convictions. Particular regard is had to 
the degree of fault by state agents necessary to attribute responsibility and the issues of 
crown immunities and vicarious liability which limit access to compensation. The 
argument is made that the most principled approach to addressing the harms caused by 
state actors is to frame relief as a constitutional tort engaging the theory of strict 
enterprise liability. 
 
Appendix 2 – Reflexivity 
The journey I have taken to arrive at this juncture in my career wherein I am now a 
member of a faculty in a law and justice program at an undergraduate liberal arts university in 
Canada and where I have the rather exquisite opportunity to obtain a PhD by Published Work 
from Anglia Ruskin University is all the more sweet as a function of events that took place just 
over ten years ago.   
As the result of a mortgage transaction in 2006, in which no one lost any money, my life 
on almost every level inexorably changed. I was charged with fraud in September 2006, which 
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was heard in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in October 2009.   In what was the first trial 
ever conducted by a newly appointed Judge, I was convicted.  She quite simply got it wrong. 
An appeal was heard in the Ontario Court of Appeal on August 17th, 2012. The 
conviction appeal was lost but the sentence appeal was successful.  A leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed. 
For someone who was a member of the legal profession for over twenty-five years, what 
has happened to me since 2006 has been illustrative, at the very least.  My thoughts throughout 
this process have consistently brought me to the question as to what does the system do to the 
“average” accused, if it can be so devastating to me as an “insider”.  
In broad strokes, prior to 2006, I was a married, relatively wealthy and successful lawyer. 
I had a wife of twenty-two years, a large investment portfolio, and perhaps the largest real estate 
practice in Simcoe County.  My experiences also included a stint as a Federal crown counsel; a 
lecturer at the Law Society of Upper Canada Bar Admission Course; a Library Board Trustee; a 
Municipal Councilor and a Police Commissioner. 
Within a year and a half after my initial charges I was a divorced, unemployed bankrupt 
on welfare who at times lived in my car or relied upon the generosity of friends to sleep on their 
couches.  The Judge on an application to stay the charges in December 2008 as a function of the 
delay in getting to trial (28 months) noted the following: 
[56]   The Defence argues that the delay in this case resulted in prejudice to the accused.  
The Defence submits that this is especially the case given the consequences to the 
accused with respect to his career and personal relationships. 
[57]   For example, following McLellan’s arrest and his release on bail McLellan was 
notified that his access to the Electronic Land Registration system had been suspended.  
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This impacted upon McLellan’s ability to practice real estate law, which he says made up 
ninety per cent of his legal practice. 
[58]   Prior to these charges, McLellan considered himself to be a successful lawyer. A 
week after he was charged, the Law Society of Upper Canada (“LSUC”) compelled him 
to provide an undertaking not to practise law until the resolution of these charges. 
[59]   Furthermore, McLellan’s wife filed for divorce in the fall of 2007, but backdated 
the date of separation to the date McLellan was first charged. 
[60]   Additionally, since being charged McLellan has lost a significant amount of assets, 
which he values at approximately $12,800,000.00.  His income has been substantially 
impacted by these charges and he has sometimes had to rely on financial assistance from 
his children.  Also, at times he has had to live in his car or on friend’s couches, and has 
gone to the food bank for food.  He is currently bankrupt and living on financial 
assistance provided by Ontario Works. 
[62]   The Crown argues that any prejudice that McLellan has suffered is primarily 
related to the charges being laid, and not any delay in the proceedings. 
[63]   I agree with the Crown... 
 
Without any finding of guilt whatsoever and having no criminal record, I was in custody 
for the last quarter of 2007 as a function of an additional charge in September 2007 that was laid 
based upon false allegations: 
 By the same officer who laid the 2006 charges; 
 Without any diligent investigation by the officer; 
 Which were withdrawn in the midst of the preliminary inquiry where it 
was clear that not only was I not guilty of the offence, but that no crime 
had been committed 
My incarceration at the Central North Correctional Centre in Penetanguishene, Ontario 
from September 27th, 2007 to December 31st, 2007 can be characterized as follows: 
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a) While in general population I was the subject of extortion; which prompted an 
emergency transfer (being a lawyer can be a precarious job description in jail);  
b) While awaiting a decision on where I would be moved, I was held in solitary 
confinement; 
c) I was finally moved to protective custody where my cell mate was being held for 
extradition to the United States for first degree murder; 
d) I had to physically defend myself; 
e) On November 30th, 2007, my gall bladder ruptured requiring emergency surgery 
where: 
i. I was operated on at Huronia District Hospital in leg irons; 
ii. I spent 8 days recovering in the hospital under 24-hour guard in full 
restraint (handcuffs to the bed rail and leg irons); 
iii. I was then moved to the prison hospital where I spent another 7 days, 
and  
iv. I was thereafter transferred far too early back to my range where I 
spent the next two weeks lying on the cement floor outside my cell 
because I was too weak to move. (At no time from the emergency 
surgery to my discharge from hospital care was my family advised as 
to the condition of my health) 
In light of the above and the fact that in the time I was in jail I had lost over twenty 
pounds, the prison physician wrote a letter for my benefit at my bail hearing on December 31st, 
2007 stating that my recovery was better served outside the jail.  It is my belief that this letter 
was instrumental in bail being granted in the face of a contested hearing. 
Having said all of the above, I am not portraying myself as someone who has necessarily 
been treated any differently from other accused. And that is the point. All of the above happened 
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while I was entitled to the presumption of innocence, as is every other accused held in custody 
prior to trial. 
 
